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LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER

MORAL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND DEMOCRACY: A
RESPONSE TO HORACIO SPECTOR 
(Accepted 29 October 2002)

In his very interesting and provocative paper,1 Horacio Spector
undertakes two tasks. First, he seeks to establish a conceptual link
between moral rights and the institution of judicial review. In particular, he attempts to establish that “moral rights justify the impartial
and independent review of legislative acts” that judicial review
involves.2 Secondly, he seeks to deflate the criticism that judicial review contravenes basic democratic principles. In this second
section, he argues that judicial review is as vindicative of the principles of public deliberation, self-government, and political equality
as is the liberal democratic ideal.
In this response, I will examine Spector’s arguments by questioning the models of judicial and legislative decisionmaking that
his paper employs, and the resulting assumptions on which his
arguments rest. I will argue that the processes and products of
these governmental systems are in fact far less distinguishable than
Spector assumes. This will erode the justification for the institution
of judicial review as a protector of moral rights. It will – perhaps
paradoxically – ameliorate the assumed tension between judicial
review and core democratic ideals.

 Paper prepared for the 2002 “Workshop on Judicial Review” sponsored by
the University of North Carolina School of Law and Department of Philosophy,
and the National Humanities Center. I am grateful to the participants in the
Workshop and to Horacio Spector for their comments and suggestions.
1 Horacio Spector, “Judicial Review, Rights, and Democracy”, Law and
Philosophy 22 (2003), pp. 285–334.
2 Ibid., p. 314.
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I. MORAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the opening sections of his paper, Horacio Spector seeks to establish a positive case for judicial review on the theory that judicial
review is a reasonable institutional interpretation of the moral rights
of individuals. The primary steps in his argument are:
(1) If we agree that people have rights, it is natural (indeed, obligatory) that we provide an institutional setting for the assertion of
those rights.
(2) Optimally (or perhaps essentially) this institutional setting must
afford an opportunity for the moral-rights holder to express
claims for violations of those rights in her own voice, and to
obtain a reasoned and impartial response which is capable of
rectifying the violation.
In addition,
(3) Constitutional rights can fairly be seen as the embodiment of
moral rights.
(4) The assertion of (morally based) constitutional rights in a court
of law meets the requirements for effective institutional settings
for the assertion of moral rights (as set forth in premise (2)
above). As a result, the enforcement of constitutional rights
through judicial review is justified.
The steps in this argument enjoy varying degrees of consensus.
The first claim – that if one accepts the idea that people have moral
rights, then there are moral reasons to look for an institutional
arrangement which enables the holders of such rights to assert their
claims – is a modest one with which it is difficult, in the abstract, to
disagree. Although it can be argued that moral rights do not necessarily entail individually assertable claims of the type that Spector
envisions, it is a reasonable assumption in most contexts that they
will.3 As an abstract or general matter, the claim that rights should
have some setting in which they can be asserted or expressed by
their holders is difficult to deny.
3

See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 151 [“to have a right is to be in a position
to make a valid claim (in accordance with a particular system of rules) that other
people should do (should refrain from doing) something and to make a complaint
if that claim is not satisfied”].
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The second claim – that this institutional setting must afford an
opportunity for the rights holder to express claims in her own voice,
and to obtain a “reasoned”, “impartial”, and effective response – is
more contestable. Although the ideas that moral-rights claims must
be provided some setting for assertion and must receive an authentic
response would seem to be entailed by our acceptance of the idea
of a right to assert such claims, the choices that Spector makes for
the further specification of these conditions are value-laden ones.
Is it essential that claims for violations of moral rights be made
in one’s own voice, if the claim is otherwise effectively raised? Is
it essential that responses be reasoned and impartial, if they are
otherwise effective in vindicating the right at stake? The answers
that one gives to these questions will depend upon further refinement of one’s notions of the nature and operation of rights. In this
analysis of Spector’s arguments, we will accept, as a starting point,
the conception of rights that the specification of these conditions
conveys.
Spector’s third claim – that constitutional rights may fairly
be seen as the embodiment of moral rights – is a careful claim
which relies upon a reasonable assumption. Constitutional rights,
in their content and function, can certainly be seen as implementing or “mirroring” the moral rights of individuals.4 Individual
constitutional rights are generally seen as entrenched guarantees
of individual freedom against possible oppression by majoritarian
government. There is, as Spector writes, a striking similarity
between the analysis of moral rights as valid claims and the
republican understanding of a free individual as an independent,
non-dominated, citizen.5 “Moral rights grant people moral powers
to question the exercise of force threatening those rights, thus
guaranteeing their status as autonomous and independent agents.”6
Individual constitutional rights – which, in content, guarantee particular freedoms – can be seen as performing the same function.
Constitutional constrains can be seen “as a good interpretation of the

4
5
6

Spector, p. 295.
Ibid., p. 296.
Ibid., p. 297.
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idea of individuals possessing moral rights affording them a status
of independence and non-domination.”7
Thus, we can establish fairly easily that constitutional rights, as
restraints on majoritarian government, can be seen as an institutional
implementation of the moral rights of individuals. However, the
conclusion that individuals should be protected against the loss of
freedoms that constitutional rights involve does not, of itself, dictate
how that protection should be accomplished. Spector’s next claim –
that the enforcement of constitutional rights through judicial review
is justified – requires more. For instance, the constitutional rights
of individuals could be implemented by legislatures as well as by
courts. Even if we agree that constitutional restraints are a good
interpretation of the idea that individuals possess moral rights, we
must still establish that courts are a superior institutional setting for
their protection if judicial review is to be justified. If legislatures are
an equally effective institution for the assertion and enforcement of
constitutional (moral) rights, we have not proven (on this basis, at
least) that judicial invalidation of legislative enactments is justified.
We must, in short, establish the special competence of courts.
In an effort to establish the special competence of courts, Spector
draws most heavily upon an idea set forth in the premise (2) above,
namely, that the moral- (or constitutional-) rights holder is entitled
to an impartial response to her asserted claim. “[A] morally justified
judgment”, Spector states, “ought to be interpreted as an impartial one.” Critical to impartiality is the principle of judex in causa
propria, or that no one can be a judge in her own cause.8
The kinds of bias or partiality under which government actors
might operate are several. First, the actor might be seen as an incidental beneficiary of the decision that he makes, since the decision
will affect the public generally and he (as a member of the public)
is thereby affected as well. Spector rejects this as the kind of bias or
partiality that he intends,9 and rightly so. All government actors are
affected by their own decisions in this sense – it is an unavoidable
feature of government service. In addition, if we are attempting to
evaluate the case for judicial review, identifying “public member7
8
9

Ibid., p. 297.
Ibid., p. 298.
Ibid., p. 301.

A RESPONSE TO HORACIO SPECTOR

339

ship” self-interest in government decisionmaking does not help,
since it is equally true of judicial and legislative outcomes.
In rejecting “public membership” self-interest as the appropriate
focus, Spector gives us a more pointed indication of what the bias
or partiality of concern might be. A government actor is “deciding
her own cause”, he writes, “when the benefits [to that actor] . . .
of a possible decision in the controversy are so important that
there is a special risk that she will have a partial, biased stance
in the situation.”10 In order to distinguish this from simple “public
membership” bias, this must mean that there is a particular risk that
the actor desires to act in her own personal self-interest (or in the
self-interest of others whom she selects) – and, furthermore, that (as
an institutional matter) she is allowed to do so.11
If a judge or legislator acts to further self-interest in this way,
and if that self-interest is – for whatever reason – congruent with
the decision that the judge or legislator should make (all things
considered), then there is, quite obviously, no problem with bias
or partiality in the sense that Spector intends. It is not the simple
congruence of self-interest with the actor’s decisions, or – I would
argue – even her awareness of or desire to implement that selfinterest, that causes the problem with which Spector is concerned.
Rather, it is when that self-interest compromises what that actor
should otherwise do in the proper execution of her government
function that a legitimate concern with partiality or bias arises. In
other words – and to place this within the context of the particular
issue before us – we are concerned when self-interest subverts the
implementation of individual moral rights or other conceptions of
the public good.
It is this deeper kind of partiality or bias with which Spector
is concerned. It is, furthermore, the danger of this kind of bias or
partiality that Spector argues will most truly distinguish legislative
and judicial functions. In legislative decisionmaking, the danger of
this kind of bias or partiality is high. Legislatures operate, essen10

Ibid., p. 301.
See, e.g., ibid., p. 299 (“The real threat to impartiality appears when the
agents of a certain group of individuals ascertain a power whose exercise means
furthering the interests of the group and setting back the interests of other
individuals.”)
11
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tially, as “market[s] of sectional interests and political bargaining.”12
Legislators are but “advocates [of] and parties” to the causes they
determine.13 Indeed, the very idea of electoral accountability –
in which legislatures, as institutions, are grounded – anticipates
(indeed, commands) that neutral principles (including moral principles) will be sacrificed to the personal interests of constituents.
Although a judge is required by her office to detachedly appraise
competing viewpoints in light of impersonal reasons and values,
a legislator is bound to attend to the interests of constituents, and
implement the personal desires of those whom she represents.
The validity of this analysis of judicial and legislative bias
depends upon a critical assumption which Spector readily acknowledges. It assumes a particular model for legislative decisionmaking
– one in which legislators are mere conduits for the viewpoints of
their constituents. In fact, whether “the idea of the public interest” as
implemented by legislators is something apart from simple aggregations of individual claims and preferences is a matter of intense
debate.14 Powerful arguments can be made that this “aggregative” view of the public interest fails to capture crucial legislative concerns. For instance, the interests that government actions
implicate often transcend jurisdictional and temporal boundaries.
Legislative decisions routinely affect the interests of individuals in
other states or nations, and they may affect not only the interests
of living persons, but of our posterity as well. It can be persuasively argued that legislators should be permitted – indeed, required
– to consider the effects of their decisions on current and future
non-constituent groups. In addition, legislators might be obliged
– on moral or other grounds – to recognize interests that only a
minority of current voters share. For instance, legislators might
well feel bound to decide that children who are particularly vulnerable to toxins should be protected from environmentally deleterious
12

Ibid., p. 302.
Ibid., p. 300.
14 See, e.g., Edgar Bodenheimer, “Prolegomena to a Theory of the Public
Interest”, in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), Nomos V: The Public Interest (New York:
Atherton Press, 1962), p. 205; Gerhard Colm, “The Public Interest: Essential Key
to Public Policy”, in ibid., p. 115; Gerhart Niemeyer, “Public Interest and Private
Utility”, in ibid., p. 1; J. Roland Pennock, “The One and the Many: A Note on the
Concept”, in ibid., p. 177.
13
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actions, even though that action is not supported by the majority of
their constituents. Obedience to transcendent moral or community
values, the need for political stability, the need to harmonize
conflicting voter preferences or policies, sensitivity to long-range
strategies, and other considerations might well require the implementation of decisions that defy an idea of simple obedience to
today’s majorities. There is no reason to assume that legislators
are oblivious to such considerations, or that they feel bound to
subordinate them to constituents’ preferences. Even the legislator
who is concerned with her popularity alone is aware that public
polls change and what is the expressed sentiment today may not
be the expressed sentiment tomorrow. The idea that legislators are
mere conduits for constituent or sectional interests is only one model
of legislative lawmaking and, I would argue, a radically incomplete
one.
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that legislators
act as brokers for their constituents’ interests (or other interests)
in the proper execution of their legislative roles. Does this create
a “special risk” that they will have a “partial, biased” stance in a
way that judicial actors do not?
The contrast, as we have constructed it, appears great. Legislators (under our stipulated model of representative democracy) are
beholden to their constituents. Judges, on the other hand, operate
with independence and detachment from the contestants before
them. They seek “to realize the ideal of impartial and reasoned
justice in an institutional setting designed to discuss the objective
merits of cases.”15 They “are expected to attend to the public good
alone.”16
Indeed, Spector states at one point that the judicial ideal that
he has in mind is that of a Cokean, “morally committed judge”.17
If one posits a legislator who implements constituents’ immediate
preferences, on the one hand, and a judge who implements moral
principles, on the other, the conclusion that moral rights of individuals are safer with the latter is not difficult to draw. The question
15

Spector, p. 303.
Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 119.
17 Spector, p. 334.
16
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is: is this model of judging what judicial review – as an institution –
really involves?
Let us begin with the idea that judges are detached from the interpersonal and political forces that conflict with an abstract notion
of the public good (and which detrimentally mold the actions of
legislators). Are not elected judges keenly aware of their constituents, and the need to obtain their favor if those judges are to survive
the next election? Are not lifetime appointees keenly aware of their
political philosophies, political agendas, and the need for public
acceptance of their decisionmaking? I would say that the question
is not really one of institutional independence and detachment from
contestants – the question is one of independence and detachment
from political forces and political ideologies that undermine recognition of individual moral rights. Regarding this question, are judges
really as “independent” and “detached” as this model assumes?
Indeed, the vision of judges as champions of individual or
minority rights against the oppression of the majority is contradicted
by much of our social and political history. Although one can point
to Supreme Court cases in which the Court rescued the rights of the
weak, unpopular, or disenfranchised from legislative trampling, one
can also point – for instance – to the first decades of the twentieth
century, when Supreme Court justices struck down legislative efforts
to protect women,18 adult workers,19 the right to unionize,20 and
more. Are we so influenced by an historical accident – the Warren
Court years – in the judicial models that we assume, that we have
elevated this to an institutional characteristic? Consider the Court’s
decisions in more recent times, in which it struck down the Violence
Against Women Act,21 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,22
and the rights of individuals to sue states for violations of federal
18

See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) and
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage laws for
women).
19 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (daily and weekly
maximum hours for bakery workers).
20 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
21 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
22 Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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laws.23 In fact, the argument that judges are different, in this regard,
is weak in recent experience. One could persuasively argue that
Congress has in fact been more attuned to individual rights in recent
years than has the Supreme Court.
There are, in addition, other assumptions about the nature of
judicial decisionmaking in this perceived difference between judges
and legislators which need to be illuminated. The idea that judges
implement “the public good” assumes that there is “X” – a “public
good” or “moral right” – that judges can implement (and in fact
do implement) in the course of constitutional decisionmaking. This
may describe some constitutional decisionmaking, but not much.
First, many important or difficult constitutional cases dealing with
individual rights involve conflicting individual rights – the right to a
fair trial vs. the right to freedom of expression, the right to religious
free exercise vs. the right to equal protection of the laws, the right to
equal protection in the method used to tabulate votes vs. the right
to have one’s vote counted, and so on. In all of these cases, the
decisionmaking process involves far more than the implementation
of a recognized moral right.
In addition, even when one individual right (alone) is at stake, the
constitutional norms involved are generally very debatable issues.
Whatever we may say about the practice of constitutional law in
our courts, it is often not much different from the policy judgments
of the legislative or executive branches. We need only consider, for
instance, the difficulties which the Court has been forced to confront
in balancing a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and the
state’s interest in fetal life, the contours of permissible free speech,
the meaning of unreasonable search and seizure, or the limits of
personal privacy, to appreciate that this decisionmaking is far closer
to judicial policymaking than the implementation of an abstract
notion of moral rights.
There are other arguments advanced for the superiority of courts.
For instance, judges have an obligation to participate in a dialogue;
judges do not control their agendas or choose to whom they will
23

See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (barring
suits against states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating federal remedy for patent violations).
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listen; judges have an obligation to articulate and justify their
decisions (on the basis of “objective” and “impartial” reasons); and
so on.24 These do, indeed, identify differences in the two processes
in question. However, do these differences really make the decisions
of judges of a “higher quality”, or necessarily more attentive to
moral rights? Or can these be as easily finessed by judges as they
are by legislators or executive branch officials?
The idea that courts protect individual moral rights more strongly
is a deeply ingrained social and political idea. Indeed, the existence of this idea may itself tend to pressure courts to implement
this result. However, we must be wary of the extent to which our
models may be driven by unjustified assumptions. In short, do we
have an overly romanticized view of the judiciary (and an overly
negative view of the products of other branches of government)
when it comes to the protection of individual moral rights – something that is more the result of recent historical accident than any
real, necessary institutional difference?
We can assume models that ensure the point: that is, we can
assume models of decisionmaking in which legislators have no independent idea of the public good, and in which judges are morally
committed individuals who implement moral rights without regard
to political (electoral) realities. This will, of course, ensure that
courts are superior institutions for the enforcement of moral rights.
However, it will also ensure that legislators are – as an institutional matter – absolved from fealty to moral ideals; and that judges
are – as an institutional matter – absolved from deference to the
products of democratic governance. The first may cripple our ability
to preserve moral rights; the second may present an insuperable
collision with democratic principles. It is to this second problem
that we now turn.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

In the last three sections of his paper, Horacio Spector defends
judicial review against the “democratic charge”. The “democratic
charge”, he argues, can be understood as a cluster of largely
consequentialist arguments which are alleged to support democratic
24

See, e.g., Spector, pp. 304, 312–314, 319–320.
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governance, and which provide implicit arguments against judicial review. These assert that democracy is valuable because it
“facilitates and enshrines public deliberation”;25 because it is an
expression of the political equality of citizens; and because it
implements the value of individual autonomy.
Regarding the first claim, Spector begins by discussing the work
of writers who maintain “that democratic deliberation provides the
best feasible setting for impartial collective decision making.”26
Discussing the work of Jeremy Waldron,27 Carlos Nino,28 and
others, Spector attacks what he identifies as a foundational assumption of deliberative democrats – namely, that deliberative democracy involves concern with (and, presumably, implementation of)
the public good. In order to mimic the procedural features of
moral discourse, democratic deliberation must satisfy certain formal
requirements, such as generality and impartiality.29 In fact, Spector
argues, majoritarian decisions are often characterized by bias
against particular individuals and minority groups. Although we
might subscribe to the idea of democratic deliberation founded
in the general good, “the kind of impartial public debate these
theorists cherish presents insurmountable problems of institutional
implementation.”30 The failure of democratic assemblies to consider
all viewpoints, the fact that public interest rhetoric can easily be used
to defend any position, and the inhibition of public discourse due
to complex political, economic, and social realities all combine to
make the deliberative democratic ideal more theoretical than real.31
Spector is certainly correct that the deliberative democratic idea
is, indeed, that – an ideal, one that may be useful in critiquing democratic functioning but is far from providing a descriptive
account of the functioning of democratic institutions. When
comparing the degree to which moral rights are institutionally
25

Ibid., p. 314.
Ibid., pp. 314–315.
27 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
28 See, e.g., Carlos Santiago Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
29 Spector, p. 315.
30 Ibid., p. 316.
31 Ibid., pp. 316–317.
26
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implemented, it is fair – as Spector argues – to compare the deliberative functioning of democratic institutions with the deliberative
functioning of the institution of judicial review. On this score, the
contest is best described as a draw. Although the judicial process
presumably involves a more explicitly mandated consideration of
individual constitutional (moral) rights, it “is only apt to guarantee
impartial treatment of parties to the process, while legislative
deliberation considers the interests of all citizens affected by . . .
law.”32 When one considers the actors involved in the two deliberative processes, the superiority of one over the other in the protection
of moral values is (as I have argued above) also far from clearcut. Just as it is an error to see legislators as necessarily engaged
in what we would call the ideal of democratic governance, so it is
an error to see the detached, impartial, morally committed judge as
a description of the members of state and federal judiciaries. Both
institutions, as an actual matter, have deliberative aspects; both may,
in fact, consider moral questions; neither is free of the perceived
and unconscious biases and prejudices which affect its actors. Thus,
while I agree with Spector that the deliberative value fails to privilege the legislative process, I demur from his conclusion that the
judicial forum necessarily provides a more adequate setting for that
process.
The second ground for the “democratic charge” to judicial review
centers upon the idea of political equality. As framed by Spector, the
idea of democracy is that all citizens enjoy “an equal role . . . in the
collective decision-making process, and every citizen has an equal
right to hold office.”33 Spector writes that “[t]hese are the two fundamental principles of the ideal of political equality that has become
associated with the system of representative democracy since the
triumph of equal voting rights.”34 The question is whether a (purely)
representative democratic system better implements this value than
a constitutional (representative) one.
If political equality is understood in a formal sense, neither
system is superior to the other in the implementation of this value.
In both systems, all citizens are endowed with the right to vote and
32
33
34

Ibid., p. 316.
Ibid., p. 329.
Ibid., p. 329.
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all votes are counted equally. Political equality in the sense of equal
political participation is, thus, guaranteed by both.
Political equality could, however, be understood quite differently.
It could be understood to command political equality not only in
a participatory sense, but in a substantive sense – a command, in
effect, that each citizen be equally empowered (in a personal sense)
to determine what actual governmental outcomes will be. If political equality is seen in this way, Spector observes, an indictment of
judicial review could follow, since “[i]t might be argued that when
one disables the Congress or other representative institutions one
is treating justices [of the reviewing court] . . . as superior to the
ordinary citizens and their representatives.”35
Spector rejects this interpretation of political equality, and I think
rightly so. Political equality in the sense of equality of personal,
substantive powers is a feature of no representative democratic
system – pure, constitutional, or otherwise. There is, furthermore,
no reason to believe that the inequality in substantive power that
exists (for instance) between citizens and their senators is any
less troubling for this ideal than the inequality that exists between
citizens and judges. This is not a valid ground for establishing
the superiority of a (pure) representative democratic system over
a constitutional (representative) one. We do not pretend – under
either system – that there is equality at the “operative” level of
government, or that such would be desirable even if it could be
achieved.
The last “democratic charge” requires that we consider whether
constitutional restrictions (enforced through judicial review) “run
afoul of the ideal of autonomy or self-government, which democracy is commonly assumed to realize.”36 Spector’s attack on
this charge is along the following lines. “Whereas individual
autonomy means that we govern our own lives, collective or political
autonomy means that we rule . . . [through] political community.”37
If that collective decisionmaking is made on anything less than
unanimous consent, the exercise of individual autonomy is necessarily curtailed. Since individual autonomy is – thus – lost under any
35
36
37

Ibid., p. 329.
Ibid., p. 323.
Ibid., p. 323.
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system of less-than-unanimous democratic governance, the particular criticism of a constitutional democratic system on this ground
is not a valid one.38
Most of the discussion in this section of Spector’s paper involves
the establishment of his major premise, namely, that individual
autonomy is lost under a regime of representative democracy. He
argues that efforts of democratic theorists to overcome this observation are unsuccessful or, in the alternative, that the strategies that
democratic theorists use to reconcile representative democracy with
individual autonomy can be used to justify constitutional restrictions as well. For instance, social contract theory offers a way of
reconciling majority rule with individual liberty by suggesting that
majority rule rests upon the consent of those who are governed.
Since constitutional restraints on majority rule are likewise part of
this voluntary social contract, they are justified (on this ground)
as well.39 Whatever problems may plague such theories (such as
whether individuals “consent” to a governmental system over which
they have no effective veto), those problems undermine the justification for a (pure) representative system as well as the justification
for constitutional restraints.
Furthermore, Spector argues, even if we agree that autonomy is
preserved (to some degree) by a (pure) representative system, it
is not obvious that a constitutional (representative) system is not
equally vindicative of this ideal. Through constitutional restraints,
individuals “might predict a net gain of autonomy by getting . . .
insurance against potential autonomy violations resulting from the
application of majority rule.”40 Indeed, “[r]ational individuals might
. . . think that establishing constitutional limitations and entrusting a
constitutional court with their application are, on balance, the best
institutional arrangement to maximize [individual] liberty . . .”41
Let us examine this second argument more closely. When
we attempt to compare the preservation of autonomy under
these governmental systems, two separately identifiable issues are
involved. First, there is the question of whether there is a quanti38
39
40
41

Ibid., pp. 323–324.
Ibid., pp. 325–326.
Ibid., p. 327.
Ibid., p. 327.
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tatively demonstrable difference in the preservation of autonomous
values when the products of a (purely) representative system and the
products of a constitutional (representative) system are compared.
Spector’s claim that the products of a constitutional (representative)
democracy may, in fact, be equally or more solicitous of these values
is difficult to refute. Clearly, there is no reason why the decisions of
judicial actors will be necessarily less influenced by the desire to
preserve this ideal than are decisions by their legislative counterparts. Indeed, since we have already stipulated that a “conduit”
theory of legislative decisionmaking will be used in our analysis, the
idea that the products of constitutional system might in fact be more
solicitous of the ideal of individual autonomy (of minority group
members, in particular) seems an entirely plausible one.
There is, however, a different way in which the exercise of
autonomy could be conceived in this context which we must
consider. Individual autonomy is conceivably concerned with not
only the products that a particular system produces, but also with
the ability of individuals to hold decisionmakers accountable to
the wishes of those individuals. In other words, the question is
not simply whether the decisions that government actors make are
congruent with the abstract ideal of autonomy (for instance, whether
they are congruent with freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and
so on) – but whether the choices and desires of citizens are honored.
Superficial analysis of this question might point to the clear
superiority of the (purely) representative democratic system. Legislators are, after all, directly elected by the people, and are – through
the threat of subsequent electoral defeat – subject to some degree
of control by them. If judges are elected, then equivalent control is
clear. But if judges are appointed – indeed, as in the federal system,
for lifetime terms – the ability of citizens to hold them accountable
seems much more problematic. Indeed, lifetime tenure and other
securities of federal judicial office were designed to place these
actors beyond political control.
When we consider the broader aspects of the question, however,
the picture become considerably more muddled. What is the
“product of representative government” which citizens seek to influence? There is more to this than bills passed by Congress or state
legislation. The “law” that is created by this process is the result
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of the power and authority of hundreds or thousands of individuals
– legislators, legislators’ staff members, executive branch officials,
administrative agencies, legislative and executive commissions, and
so on. These actors are often as removed – or more removed – from
popular control as judges, who are either the subjects of popular
election themselves or are the subjects of prominent appointment by
those who are. Although the diverse group of largely unknown and
unelected actors in the legislative and executive branches of government described above may not enjoy the protection of lifetime
tenure, their decisions may – as a practical matter – be as effectively
insulated from popular scrutiny and popular control. Although we
tend to associate popular control with the legislative and executive
branches of government, when the actual products of these actors
are considered the picture is far more complex. If we are concerned
with the ability of citizens to influence the products of government,
there is – in reality – little principled distinction between much of
the products of the elected branches of government and the products
of the courts.
This last observation identifies a difficulty that underlies
Spector’s positions and the arguments of others in favor of judicial
review. In order to establish a positive case for judicial review, we
must establish the superiority of judicial over legislative processes
and products, since judicial review assumes the invalidation of
legislation by courts. Implicit in this is the idea that the processes
and products of these governmental institutions are different in
important ways – for instance, that decisions by courts are characterized by detached and impartial consideration of the issues, while
the decisions of legislators are the expression of political forces and
constituents’ wishes. To defend judicial review against the “democratic charge”, however, our task becomes the opposite. Now we
must establish that both institutions, in fact, involve deliberative
processes that are quite similar; that both involve a similar vision
of political equality; and that both preserve – in their processes and
products – the individual autonomous ideal.
The tension between these objectives is rooted, of course, in
the age-old paradox that judicial review in a democratic system
involves. It is difficult to maintain that representative democratic
government should both be trumped and remain paramount. It is
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difficult to argue that the “conduit” theory of democratic rule is
bad for the preservation of moral rights, but should be extolled as
preservative of the autonomy of citizens. I would argue that there
is, in fact, less tension between judicial review and democracy than
we usually believe; but that this is because of the failure of both
institutions to reflect (in practice) the idealized notions that we have
for them – not (as Spector argues) solely by reason of the failure of
democratic institutions to realize this ideal.

III. CONCLUSION

In summary, our assessment of judicial review as a reasonable institutional interpretation of the moral rights of individuals is mixed.
The idea that constitutional rights reflect moral rights of individuals
is a reasonable one. However, this does not – in itself – establish the
supremacy of the judicial branch of government of government to
interpret and enforce these rights, which judicial review requires. To
do this, we must establish that courts are superior institutions for the
performance of this function. Whether this is true will depend, most
critically, upon the models of judicial and legislative lawmaking that
we employ. It will also depend upon the extent to which we see
human beings – whether judges or legislators – willing and able to
execute the idealized roles that we specify. Just as legislators fail to
exhibit detachment from cultural, political, and ideological forces,
so judges do as well. One cannot reflect – for instance – upon the
centuries of judicial enforcement of slavery, the subordination of
women, the oppression of gay men and lesbian women, and other
failures in our history without acknowledging that courts have often
been as poor as legislatures in protecting moral rights.
There are, of course, prominent and welcome examples of judicial enforcement of moral rights in the face of legislative resistence
and popular prejudice. Whether – in absolute terms – judicial or
legislatively inspired reforms have in fact contributed more to the
cause of moral rights in our history would be a highly debatable
issue. However, the fact that we so readily associate this function
with the courts may identify the greatest value of judicial review.
Through the idea of the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights,
we enshrine the idea of individual responsibility for decisionmaking
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and individual cognizance of moral rights. We must be careful,
however, lest our association of these obligations with courts causes
us to confine them to what is (in the end) the weakest branch of
government.
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